"The basic question here is: Should we introduce this kind of vulnerability into our infrastructure? Why - when there is an alternative - why should we add vulnerabilities to our infrastructure?" said Clarke, who argued that LNG facilities should be placed in remote areas.
Clarke, who was a top security advisor to three U.S. presidents, spoke to a friendly audience of students and community members gathered in Salomon 101.
Hosted by the Taubman Center for Public Policy, the forum included Clarke's release of a 160-page security risk management analysis of the proposed LNG projects in Rhode Island requested by state Attorney General Patrick Lynch '87.
Lynch also spoke at length in opposition to the expansion of LNG facilities in Providence, preceded by remarks by U.S. Rep. Patrick Kennedy, D-R.I., who represents Rhode Island's 1st District, and Professor of Political Science Darrell West, director of the Taubman Center.
Lynch and other Rhode Island and Massachusetts officials oppose the LNG projects, which include the expansion of the current facility in Field's Point, Providence, operated by KeySpan LNG, and the construction of a 73-acre LNG terminal site in Fall River, Mass., by Weavers Cove Energy and Hess LNG, and which would require LNG to be offloaded from tankers traveling up Narragansett Bay to the terminals.
The projects have yet to be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which Lynch argues is overly favorable to industry interests.
LNG is natural gas cooled to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, turning it into a liquid one-600th its volume in its gas state, making it easier to transport in bulk. It is valued as a clean-burning energy source, and Clarke and Lynch both emphasized that it is needed in New England as a source of electrical power.
But, Clarke said, the placement of the facilities in densely populated areas, and the 29-mile path the tankers will have to take up the bay to the terminals, will represent a tempting target for terrorist attacks.
"In the past, the government has always asked itself: What are the probabilities of an event occurring?" Clarke said. "What we're saying is that when it comes to terrorism in this day and age, after 9/11, we can no longer say, 'Look at the numbers.' ... It's not a danger you can quantify."
Instead, he said, his team from Good Harbor Consulting analyzed five factors for the threat of terrorism: intent, capabilities of the terrorists, vulnerabilities of the site, the consequences of an attack and the specifics of recovery operations.
Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations, Clarke said, have made their intentions of mass-casualty, high-profile attacks on U.S. soil clear, and in the past have attacked gas and oil targets, including the October 2002 attack on the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen.
The means for such attacks, he said, are readily available in the United States. Clarke cited the easy availability of aircraft, small watercraft, scuba gear, automatic weapons and explosives.
"It seems that in the United States it's as easy to steal TNT as it is to steal cars in South Boston," Clarke said. "Not in Providence," he quickly added, glancing at Lynch.
In analyzing the vulnerabilities of the Providence-bound LNG tankers, Clarke said, his team looked at three types of attacks: airborne attack by aircraft, maritime attack by small boats or frogmen and attack by anti-tank weapons from the shore.
"We asked ourselves, could we ... design a defense against these three kinds of attacks that the terrorists could not penetrate? Unfortunately, the answer is no," he said.
Clarke said his team tried to come up with defenses for the LNG facilities, including armor plating, not freezing the natural gas during transport and applying stringent Nuclear Regulatory Commission construction standards for the facilities.
"None of these things appear to be practical; all of them appear to be expensive," he said.
He said that securing the bay's coastline would require hundreds if not thousands of police officers, and that the Coast Guard did not have the "capabilities or rules of engagement" to stop a small group of determined terrorists, especially given the common al-Qaida tactic of a two-wave attack, the first to disable defenders and the second on the primary target.
The currently proposed security plan, which would have the Coast Guard secure an area around the tankers two miles in front, one mile in back and 1,000 meters to each side, would be impractical, insufficient and disruptive, Clarke said.
"We are unaware of any analysis performed by counter-terrorism experts in the U.S. government, such as the U.S. Special Operation Command, that would demonstrate the ability of the Coast Guard and the Rhode Island police to prevent attacks by determined and skilled terrorists on either the urban off-loading facility and/or the LNG tanker during its 29 mile inland waterway transit," Clarke wrote in an executive summary of his report, distributed after the forum.
Clarke said such an attack would be catastrophic.
"Our estimate is, if this occurs during midday on a weekday during the offloading (of LNG), there would be 3,000 prompt deaths," he said, and another 10,000 people would be badly burnt. There would be massive damage to the surrounding area, which includes a chemical plant and other infrastructure that could cause secondary explosions.
According to maps of potential damage to the area surrounding the proposed LNG terminal in Providence provided by the attorney general's office, the immediate area would be flattened, a surrounding area would see residents suffer second-degree burns and wood structures ignite, and an outer area would see minor damage. Brown's campus is located in the outer ring.
"There is no way New England's trauma and burn capabilities could deal with an event of this magnitude," Clarke said.
Brown Emergency Medical Services on April 10 conducted a mass casualty drill under the scenario of a LNG tanker exploding in Narragansett Bay.
But, Clarke said, first responders would not be able to respond to emergency situations near the blast and fire, which he said would emit a minimum of 10,000 BTUs. Firefighters do not attempt to approach fires greater than 2,000 BTUs in intensity, he said.
The solution, Clarke said, is to locate the needed LNG facilities in remote areas, perhaps offshore.
In the early 1970s, Clarke said, an LNG terminal was placed in Boston Harbor, which now represents a possible target for terrorism. On Sept. 11, 2001, he ordered the Harbor shut down over fears of an attack on the LNG tankers. Since then, he said, large LNG facilities have not been built in densely populated areas.
"The simplest defense mechanism we have against attacks on the LNG offloading facility is to locate it where it won't hurt anyone," Clarke said to applause from the audience. "It might be more expensive to locate it elsewhere, but not compared to the cost of a disaster."
Kennedy, speaking prior to Clarke's presentation, criticized the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which has authority over the placement of LNG facilities, for not taking local opinions and factors into consideration.
"Rhode Island wasn't given the chance to have input, to have formal input, on this issue," Kennedy said. "We have a democracy in this country, but the way this works isn't democratic at all."
Lynch also spoke and showed a short video detailing his opposition to the proposed LNG facilities.
"LNG is good. None of us are here to say it's not," he said. But he said the FERC should take "the health and safety of our citizens" into account when placing LNG facilities. He also cited the possible environmental impact of the tankers.
The FERC will probably decide whether to approve the projects within the next two months, Kennedy said.
Lynch emphasized that, with other Rhode Island and Massachusetts officials, he will continue to fight the LNG projects through lawsuits and protests.
"We may not have the one stab wound to kill this project," he said in the video. "We can still kill it with a thousand paper cuts."
