On March 18, the New York Times published an article that detailed the emergence of new strategies for combating terrorism. According to the article, counterterrorism experts are rethinking the assumption that Islamic extremists cannot be deterred. The reasoning behind this assumption initially seemed sound. Many extremists believe that they are carrying out a mission as mandated by a higher religious authority and that their actions will bring rewards in the afterlife. It made sense to conclude that extremists would not be dissuaded by the possibility of any worldly retaliation. But more recently, American officials are taking a closer look at the goals and motives of terrorist organizations with the hope of developing a counterterrorism strategy that will deter and delegitimize violent extremism.
According to the article, a variety of approaches have emerged from this newfound emphasis on deterrence. The American government is working to propagate statements from Islamic religious leaders denying that suicide bombers will be rewarded in the afterlife and declaring that terrorism is antithetical to fundamental Muslim values. Of the suggestions offered in the article, this idea seemed like one of the most promising. Other possible deterrence mechanisms - like the New York Police Department's plan to have massive police presences "converge twice daily at randomly selected times and at randomly selected sites ... to rehearse their response to a terrorist attack" - seemed counterproductive and unnecessarily disruptive.
Of course, whether or not these measures will succeed remains to be seen. Yet American citizens concerned about the terrorist threat should applaud law enforcement agencies' openness to new ways of thinking. The White House's 2002 National Security Strategy declared bluntly, "Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work" in the fight against terrorism. Those familiar with the Bush administration's dogmatism on a variety of issues (especially national security policy) are understandably surprised by such a complete reversal in position. Moreover, in the current landscape of American political discourse, those who support anything less than the harshest measures against terrorists are generally written off as soft or unpatriotic. (See the ongoing debate over waterboarding.) It is reassuring that new, untraditional and previously ignored counterterrorism strategies can still gain traction with policy makers.
Terrorists could carry out a lethal attack on American soil with remarkable ease. In a population of 300 million, it would only take a handful of willing individuals with modest ingenuity and decent access to resources to inflict great harm. When I contrast the apparent ease of committing a terrorist attack with the fact that terrorists have not struck American soil in over six years, I am left wondering: Why aren't terrorist attacks occurring on a daily, monthly or yearly basis?
The first possible answer is that our defense and counterterrorism efforts are just that good. However, this is almost certainly not the case. America's borders and ports are poorly secured. Moreover, most Americans carry on their daily affairs without interference from counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies. There are no security checkpoints on busy streets or subways.
The more likely explanation for the apparent lull in terrorist activity is that American citizens and policymakers have misperceived the nature and extent of the threat. Indeed, infrequency is an aspect of terrorism that must be analyzed and considered. I do not mean to trivialize the events of Sept. 11 or to ignore the national trauma that resulted. And I certainly do not believe that the infrequency of terrorism in America justifies relaxing counterterrorism efforts. My point is that our understanding of terrorism as a constant, menacing and inescapable threat continues to diverge from reality. As a result, counterterrorism experts must remain open to a variety of strategic options. Citizens should not hesitate to question the value of practices - harsh interrogation, wiretapping, random searches and other forms of surveillance - that have heretofore been labeled as crucial. The government's willingness to adjust positions on the question of deterrence exemplifies the kind of flexibility that must guide counterterrorism policy.
Counterterrorism policy deserves a realistic and logical analysis of probabilities, costs and benefits. Assume, for instance, that law enforcement agencies searched 1 percent of the bags of subway goers in major cities or tapped 1 percent of phone calls each day. What are the chances that the group of people subjected to surveillance would contain a potential terrorist? Would this probability be high enough to justify the costs (compared to alternative mechanisms)?
In deciding which policies to pursue, we cannot afford to become dogmatic or to write off opponents of a particular policy with unfair labels.
Matt Aks '11 cannot be deterred
